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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM

DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING OF TERM "CHILDREN" AS USED IN TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION

The testatrix in In re Villalonga's Will,' provided by the seventh clause of
her will: "I give ... the residue ... of my property ... in trust ... to pay the
income to my son John ... and upon his death, . . . the income to go to his
wife Constance C. Villalonga, and upon the death of both my son . .. and his
wife I direct the principal to be paid over to any children surviving him, or
his wife and if no children survive them, I . . . direct that the property be
distributed between the children of my nephew, R. F. Graves. ' 2 The life
beneficiaries had two daughters, Amy and Jane C.... Jane C. did not survive
the life tenants, but left a daughter Jane T. The issue before the Court was
whether the testatrix meant to include only the first generation, or intended
to include more remote descendants of the life tenants, within the phrase,
"children surviving them." The Court of Appeals, in 5-2 opinion, held children
did not include grandchildren and that Amy Villalonga was entitled to the
entire remainder, as the sole surviving child of the life tenants, to the exclusion
of Jane T., the granddaughter.
The majority relied heavily upon In re Schaujele's Will,3 as a leading
authority for the rule that the word "children" does not include more remote
offspring than the first generation, unless the will as a whole shows an unmistakable intent to include grandchildren. The Restatement of Property4 states
that there is a presumption that the word "children" means only the first
generation, and enumerates factors which, if present, tend to show an intent to
include more remote descendants. The most common factors tending to establish a contrary intent are: (1) the will as a whole shows an intent to benefit
equally two or more groups, and this is more effectively accomplished by a
broader construction of the word "children",5 (2) a gift to the children of A
with a gift over upon a failure of the children of A, tends to show that the
term "children" included more remote descendants, since a testator is seldom
likely to prefer collaterals over direct descendants. 6 The preceding proposition
is found in Prowitt v. Rodman,7 much relied upon by the granddaughter of the
life tenants in the instant case. The majority, in distinguishing the Prowitt
case, found that in that case there were no surviving children, so either grandchildren of the life tenants or collaterals would take. But in the instant case
the question was whether a child of the life tenants took, to the exclusion of a
grandchild, rather than both taking per stirpes. The majority then reasoned
1. 6 N.Y.2d 477, 190 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1959).
2. Id. at 479, 190 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1959).
3. 252 N.Y. 65, 168 N.E. 831 (1929).
4. RESTAT=NT, PROPERTY § 285.

S. Id. § 285(b).
6. Id. § 285(f).

7. 37 N.Y. 42 (1867).
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that the presumption against disinheritance of descendants in favor of collaterals, expressed in the Prowitt case, did not apply when the gift over to
collaterals was inoperative. They further distinguished the Prowitt case, on the
ground that the words "issue" and "children" were used interchangeably,
justifying an inference that "issue" and "children" were used loosely, to refer
to descendants in general, whereas the instant case used only the word "children" when referring to issue of the life tenants. The majority held fast to the
rule in the Schaufele case, and concluded that no such unmistakable intent
to include grandchildren had been shown by other language or expressions in
the will.
The dissent reasoned thus: New York cases could be cited on both sides
of the issue, but reason and justice required that "children" be construed to
include grandchildren, so a more equitable distribution to descendants would
result. 8 The very strict construction of the term "children," by the majority,
was only required in cases where the testator appeared to be referring to his
own children as named individuals.9 If there were no surviving children of the
life tenants, the testatrix could not have intended the gift over to grandnephews
and grandnieces to take effect, to the exclusion of such life tenant's own grandchild, a direct descendant of the testatrix. 0
Both constructions of the term "children" are reasonable, but the more
equitable one appears to be that taken by the dissent. The majority concedes
this by saying, "The fact that the distribution made in this will may not be in
complete accord with individual notions of equitable distribution, is not sufficient to warrant the interference of the courts." They felt compelled by the
Schaufele Case to rule against the grandchild Jane T., yet that case appears
distinguishable from the instant case. There, the testatrix had divided her
estate into three parts, one going to a daughter, one to a son, and the other to
two children of a deceased son. She provided that if her remaining son died
without issue, his part should go to her children then living. The son died
without issue and the daughter took the gift over to the exclusion of the two
grandchildren. This was a secondary devise rather than a primary bequest, to
which the presumption against disinheritance is not usually applied, 1 and the
testatrix had only one child who could possibly survive her son, justifying a
conclusion that she was using the word children to refer to her only daughter
8.

In re Paton, 111 N.Y. 486, 18 N.E. 625 (1888); In re King, 217 N.Y. 361, 155

N.E. 1060 (1916).
9. In re Barnes' Will, 2 N.Y.2d 787, 158 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1955).
10. In re Stecher, 190 Misc. 502, 81 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
11. In re Keogh, 126 App. Div. 285, 110 N.Y. Supp. 868 (2d Dep't 1908), the presumption that a testator did not intend to disinherit a descendant in favor of a collateral

heir, does not apply to a case where the gift is not a primary bequest, but is a gift over
upon the failure of a primary bequest . . . e.g. to "A" for life and at his death to the
children of "A" then living. The gift to "A's" children is a primary devise. To "A" for
life and at "A's" death to the children of "A" then living, but if no children be then
living, to the children of "B" living at "A's" death. The gift to the children of "B" is a
secondary devise and a gift over from a primary devise. The presumption against disinheritance does not apply to the gift to the children of "B".

140

COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
as a named individual. This is in accord with the dissent's viewpoint that a
very strict construction of the term children is only required when the testator
appears to be referring to his own immediate offspring as named individuals.
Davids' The New York Law of Wills 1 2 states that there is a conflict between
the presumption that the term children means immediate offspring, and the
presumption that the testator did not intend to discriminate between his direct
descendants, when either could apply in the same case. Other factors in the
will may then be decisive in determining the meaning of the word "children."
As previously stated, other provisions of the will appear to have thrown the
balance in favor of an equality of distribution among direct descendants.
The majority in the instant case, fix the time, when the presumption is
to be applied at the death of the life tenant, instead of at the death of the
testatrix, or at the time the will was executed. This is contrary to the settled
proposition that a will is not to be construed in the light of events taking place
long after the death of a testator, but by what was probably in his mind
when the will was executed.13 If the majority did not construe the testatrix'
intention as of the death of the life tenant, it must then have held that at the
time of execution, the testatrix intended to give a gift to the immediate issue
of the life tenant, or in the alternative, a gift to grandchildren and more
remote descendants if no immediate issue survive the life tenant, or further, in
the absence of remote issue, to grandnephews and grandnieces. To arrive at
such an extreme construction of the phrase "to any children surviving him"
without the aid of a presumption can hardly be justified.
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF TRUSTEE To INVADE CoRPus
"In the absence of an express grant of such power to the trustee, either by
the settlor or by statute, the trustee has no power to modify or terminate the
trust. His ordinary duty is to enforce the trust, not to end it. The settlor may
lawfully vest in the trustee power to modify the trust or terminate it either in
the discretion of the trustee or on the happening of certain events." 14
It is not infrequent that the settlor gives the cestui power to end the trust
or to demand a conveyance from the trustee. 15
The exercise, by a trustee, of a power to encroach upon corpus, necessarily involves an authority to end the trust in whole or in part. In many
instances, the extent to which a discretionary power in regard to corpus
Vol. 2, § 661 (1923).
In considering the effect of the codicil, we do not look to what happened,
when it became operative. We seek for what the testator intended by it
when arranging the disposition of his residuary estate. The intention of
testator is to be ascertained not by what occurred long after the execution
of his will, but by what was apparently, or presumably, in his contemplation, at the time he was making it. In re Hoffman, 201 N.Y. 247, 255,
94 N.E. 990, 993 (1911).
14. 4 BOGaRT, TRuSTs AND TRusrTrs § 1000 (1948 ed.); see also, Schreyer v. Schreyer,
101 App. Div. 456, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd 182 N.Y. 555, 75 N.E. 1139.
15. In re Woollard, 295 N.Y. 390, 68 N.E.2d 181 (1946); In re Morse, 280 App. Div.
171, 112 N.YS.2d 392 (4th Dep't 1952).
12.
13.

